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Abstract
This paper presents a specification-guided safety verification
method for feedforward neural networks with general acti-
vation functions. As such feedforward networks are mem-
oryless, they can be abstractly represented as mathematical
functions, and the reachability analysis of the neural network
amounts to interval analysis problems. In the framework of
interval analysis, a computationally efficient formula which
can quickly compute the output interval sets of a neural net-
work is developed. Then, a specification-guided reachabil-
ity algorithm is developed. Specifically, the bisection pro-
cess in the verification algorithm is completely guided by a
given safety specification. Due to the employment of the
safety specification, unnecessary computations are avoided
and thus computational cost can be reduced significantly. Ex-
periments show that the proposed method enjoys much more
efficiency in safety verification with significantly less compu-
tational cost.
1 Introduction
Artificial neural networks have been widely used in machine
learning systems. Though neural networks have been show-
ing effectiveness and powerful ability in resolving complex
problems, they are confined to systems which comply only
to the lowest safety integrity levels since, in most of time,
a neural network is viewed as a black box without effective
methods to assure safety specifications for its outputs. Neural
networks are trained over a finite number of input and out-
put data, and are expected to be able to generalize to produce
desirable outputs for given inputs even including previously
unseen inputs. However, in many practical applications, the
number of inputs is essentially infinite, this means it is im-
possible to check all the possible inputs only by performing
experiments and moreover, it has been observed that neural
networks can react in unexpected and incorrect ways to even
slight perturbations of their inputs [1], which could result in
unsafe systems. Hence, methods that are able to provide for-
mal guarantees are in a great demand for verifying specifica-
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tions or properties of neural networks. Verifying neural net-
works is a hard problem, even simple properties about them
have been proven NP-complete problems [2]. The difficulties
mainly come from the presence of activation functions and
the complex structures, making neural networks large-scale,
nonlinear, non-convex and thus incomprehensible to humans.
The importance of methods of formal guarantees for neural
networks has been well-recognized in literature. There ex-
ist a number of results for verification of feedforward neural
networks, especially for Rectifier Linear Unit (ReLU) neural
networks, and a few results are devoted to neural networks
with broad classes of activation functions. Motivated to gen-
eral class of neural networks such as those considered in [3],
our key contribution in this paper is to develop a specification-
guided method for safety verification of feedforward neural
network. First, we formulate the safety verification problem
in the framework of interval arithmetic, and provide a com-
putationally efficient formula to compute output interval sets.
The developed formula is able to calculate the output inter-
vals in a fast manner. Then, analogous to other state-of-the-art
verification methods, such as counterexample-guided abstrac-
tion refinement (CEGAR) [4] and property directed reachabil-
ity (PDR) [5], and inspired by the Moore-Skelboe algorithm
[6], a specification-guided algorithm is developed. Briefly
speaking, the safety specification is utilized to examine the
existence of intersections between output intervals and un-
safe regions and then determine the bisection actions in the
verification algorithm. By making use of the information of
safety specification, the computation cost can be reduced sig-
nificantly. We provide experimental evidences to show the ad-
vantages of specification-guided approach, which shows that
our approach only needs about 3%–7% computational cost of
the method proposed in [3] to solve the same safety verifica-
tion problem.
2 Related Work
Many recent works are focusing on ReLU neural networks. In
[2], an SMT solver named Reluplex is proposed for a special
class of neural networks with ReLU activation functions. The
Reluplex extends the well-known Simplex algorithm from lin-
ear functions to ReLU functions by making use of the piece-
wise linear feature of ReLU functions. In [7], A layer-by-
layer approach is developed for the output reachable set com-
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putation of ReLU neural networks. The computation is for-
mulated in the form of a set of manipulations for a union of
polyhedra. A verification engine for ReLU neural networks
called AI2 was proposed in [8]. In their approach, the au-
thors abstract perturbed inputs and safety specifications as
zonotopes, and reason about their behavior using operations
for zonotopes. An Linear Programming (LP)-based method
is proposed [9], and in [10] authors encoded the constraints
of ReLU functions as a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
(MILP). Combining output specifications that are expressed
in terms of LP, the verification problem for output set even-
tually turns to a feasibility problem of MILP. In [11, 12],
an MILP based verification engine called Sherlock that per-
forms an output range analysis of ReLU feedforward neural
networks is proposed, in which a combined local and global
search is developed to more efficiently solve MILP.
Besides the results for ReLU neural networks, there are
a few other results for neural networks with general activa-
tion functions. In [13, 14], a piecewise-linearization of the
nonlinear activation functions is used to reason about their
behaviors. In this framework, the authors replace the acti-
vation functions with piecewise constant approximations and
use the bounded model checker hybrid satisfiability (HySAT)
[15] to analyze various properties. In their papers, the au-
thors highlight the difficulty of scaling this technique and,
currently, are only able to tackle small networks with at most
20 hidden nodes. In [16], the authors proposed a framework
for verifying the safety of network image classification deci-
sions by searching for adversarial examples within a speci-
fied region. A adaptive nested optimization framework is pro-
posed for reachability problem of neural networks in [17].
In [3], a simulation-based approach was developed, which
used a finite number of simulations/computations to estimate
the reachable set of multi-layer neural networks in a general
form. Despite this success, the approach lacks the ability to
resolve the reachable set computation problem for neural net-
works that are large-scale, non-convex, and nonlinear. Still,
simulation-based approaches, like the one developed in [3],
present a plausibly practical and efficient way of reasoning
about neural network behaviors. The critical step in improv-
ing simulation-based approaches is bridging the gap between
finitely many simulations and the essentially infinite num-
ber of inputs that exist in the continuity set. Sometimes, the
simulation-based approach requires a large number of sim-
ulations to obtain a tight reachable set estimation, which is
computationally costly in practice. In this paper, our aim is to
reduce the computational cost by avoiding unnecessary com-
putations with the aid of a specification-guided method.
3 Background
3.1 Feedforward Neural Networks
Generally speaking, a neural network consists of a number of
interconnected neurons and each neuron is a simple process-
ing element that responds to the weighted inputs it received
from other neurons. In this paper, we consider feed-forward
neural networks, which generally consist of one input layer,
multiple hidden layers and one output layer. The action of
a neuron depends on its activation function, which is in the
form of
yi = φ
(∑n
j=1
ωijxj + θi
)
(1)
where xj is the jth input of the ith neuron, ωij is the weight
from the jth input to the ith neuron, θi is called the bias of the
ith neuron, yi is the output of the ith neuron, φ(·) is the activa-
tion function. The activation function is generally a nonlinear
continuous function describing the reaction of ith neuron with
inputs xj , j = 1, · · · , n. Typical activation functions include
ReLU, logistic, tanh, exponential linear unit, linear functions,
for instance. In this work, our approach aims at being capable
of dealing with activation functions regardless of their specific
forms.
A feedforward neural network has multiple layers, and each
layer `, 1 ≤ ` ≤ L, has n{`} neurons. In particular, layer
` = 0 is used to denote the input layer and n{0} stands for the
number of inputs in the rest of this paper. For the layer `, the
corresponding input vector is denoted by x{`} and the weight
matrix is
W{`} =
[
ω
{`}
1 , . . . , ω
{`}
n{`}
]>
(2)
where ω{`}i is the weight vector. The bias vector for layer ` is
θ{`} =
[
θ
{`}
1 , . . . , θ
{`}
n{`}
]>
. (3)
The output vector of layer ` can be expressed as
y{`} = φ`(W{`}x{`} + θ{`}) (4)
where φ`(·) is the activation function of layer `.
The output of ` − 1 layer is the input of ` layer, and the
mapping from the input of input layer, that is x[0], to the out-
put of output layer, namely y[L], stands for the input-output
relation of the neural network, denoted by
y{L} = Φ(x{0}) (5)
where Φ(·) , φL ◦ φL−1 ◦ · · · ◦ φ1(·).
3.2 Problem Formulation
We start by defining the neural network output set that will
become of interest all through the rest of this paper.
Definition 3.1 Given a feedforward neural network in the
form of (5) and an input set X ⊆ Rn{0} , the following set
Y =
{
y{L} ∈ Rn{L} | y{L} = Φ(x{0}), x{0} ∈ X
}
(6)
is called the output set of neural network (5).
The safety specification of a neural network is expressed
by a set defined in the output space, describing the safety re-
quirement.
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Definition 3.2 Safety specification S formalizes the safety re-
quirements for output y[L] of neural network (5), and is a
predicate over output y[L] of neural network (5). The neu-
ral network (5) is safe if and only if the following condition is
satisfied:
Y ∩ ¬S = ∅ (7)
where Y is the output set defined by (6), and ¬ is the symbol
for logical negation.
The safety verification problem for the neural network (5)
is stated as follows.
Problem 3.1 How does one verify the safety requirement de-
scribed by (7), given a neural network (5) with a compact
input set X and a safety specification S?
The key for solving the safety verification Problem 3.1 is
computing output set Y . However, since neural networks are
often nonlinear and non-convex, it is extremely difficult to
compute the exact output set Y . Rather than directly comput-
ing the exact output set for a neural network, a more practical
and feasible way for safety verification is to derive an over-
approximation of Y .
Definition 3.3 A set Yo is an over-approximation of Y if Y ⊆
Yo holds.
The following lemma implies that it is sufficient to use the
over-approximated output set for the safety verification of a
neural network.
Lemma 3.1 Consider a neural network in the form of (5) and
a safety specification S, the neural network is safe if the fol-
lowing condition is satisfied
Yo ∩ ¬S = ∅ (8)
where Y ⊆ Yo.
Proof. Due to Y ⊆ Yo, (8) implies Y ∩ ¬S = ∅. 
From Lemma 3.1, the problem turns to how to construct an
appropriate over-approximation Yo. One natural way, as the
method developed in [3], is to find a set Yo as small as possi-
ble to tightly over-approximate output set Y and further per-
form safety verification. However, this idea sometimes could
be computationally expensive, and actually most of computa-
tions are unnecessary for safety verification. In the following,
a specification-guided approach will be developed, and the
over-approximation of output set is computed in an adaptive
way with respect to a given safety specification.
4 Safety Verification
4.1 Preliminaries and Notation
Let [x] = [x, x], [y] = [y, y] be real compact intervals and
◦ be one of the basic operations addition, subtraction, multi-
plication and division, respectively, for real numbers, that is
◦ ∈ {+,−, ·, /}, where it is assumed that 0 /∈ [b] in case of
division. We define these operations for intervals [x] and [y]
by [x] ◦ [y] = {x ◦ y | x ∈ [y], x ∈ [y]}. The width of
an interval [x] is defined and denoted by w([x]) = x − x.
The set of compact intervals in R is denoted by IR. We say
[φ] : IR→ IR is an interval extension of function φ : R→ R,
if for any degenerate interval arguments, [φ] agrees with φ
such that [φ]([x, x]) = φ(x). In order to consider multidi-
mensional problems where x ∈ Rn is taken into account, we
denote [x] = [x1, x1] × · · · × [xn, xn] ∈ IRn, where IRn
denotes the set of compact interval in Rn. The width of an
interval vector x is the largest of the widths of any of its com-
ponent intervals w([x]) = maxi=1,...,n(xi − xi). A mapping
[Φ] : IRn → IRm denotes the interval extension of a function
Φ : Rn → Rm. An interval extension is inclusion monotonic
if, for any [x1], [x2] ∈ IRn, [x1] ⊆ [x2] implies [Φ]([x1]) ⊆
[Φ]([x2]). A fundamental property of inclusion monotonic in-
terval extensions is that x ∈ [x] ⇒ Φ(x) ∈ [Φ]([x]), which
means the value of Φ is contained in the interval [Φ]([x]) for
every x in [x].
Several useful definitions and lemmas are presented.
Definition 4.1 [18] Piece-wise monotone functions, includ-
ing exponential, logarithm, rational power, absolute value,
and trigonometric functions, constitute the set of standard
functions.
Lemma 4.1 [18] A function Φ which is composed by finitely
many elementary operations {+,−, ·, /} and standard func-
tions is inclusion monotone.
Definition 4.2 [18] An interval extension [Φ]([x]) is said
to be Lipschitz in [x0] if there is a constant ξ such that
w([Φ]([x])) ≤ ξw([x]) for every [x] ⊆ [x0].
Lemma 4.2 [18] If a function Φ(x) satisfies an ordinary Lip-
schitz condition in [x0],
‖Φ(x2)− Φ(x1)‖ ≤ ξ ‖x2 − x1‖ , x1,x2 ∈ [x0] (9)
then the interval extension [Φ]([x]) is a Lipschitz interval ex-
tension in [x0],
w([Φ]([x])) ≤ ξw([x]), [x] ⊆ [x0]. (10)
The following trivial assumption is given for activation
functions.
Assumption 4.1 The activation function φ considered in this
paper is composed by finitely many elementary operations
and standard functions.
Based on Assumption 4.1, the following result can be ob-
tained for a feedforward neural network.
Theorem 4.1 The interval extension [Φ] of neural network Φ
composed by activation functions satisfying Assumption 4.1 is
inclusion monotonic and Lipschitz such that
w([Φ]([x])) ≤ ξL
∏L
`=1
∥∥∥W{`}∥∥∥w([x]), [x] ⊆ IRn{0}
(11)
3
where ξ is a Lipschitz constant for all activation functions in
Φ.
Proof. Under Assumption 4.1, the inclusion monotonicity
can be obtained directly based on Lemma 4.1. Then, for the
layer `, we denote φˆ`(x{`}) = φ`(W{`}x{`} + θ{`}). For
any x1,x2, it has∥∥∥φˆ`(x{`}2 )− φˆ`(x{`}1 )∥∥∥ ≤ ξ ∥∥∥W{`}x{`}2 −Wx{`}1 ∥∥∥
≤ ξ
∥∥∥W{`}∥∥∥∥∥∥x{`}2 − x{`}1 ∥∥∥ .
Due to x{`} = φˆ`−1(x{`−1}), ` = 1, . . . , L, we have
ξL
∏L
`=1
∥∥W{`}∥∥ the Lipschitz constant for Φ, and (11) can
be established by Lemma 4.2. 
4.2 Interval Analysis
First, we consider a single layer y = φ(Wx + θ). Given an
interval input [x], the interval extension is [φ](W[x] + θ) =
[y
1
, y1]× · · · × [yn, yn] = [y], where
y
i
= min
x∈[x]
φ
(∑n
j=1
ωijxj + θi
)
(12)
yi = max
x∈[x]
φ
(∑n
j=1
ωijxj + θi
)
. (13)
To compute the interval extension [φ], we need to compute
the minimum and maximum values of the output of nonlinear
function φ. For general nonlinear functions, the optimization
problems are still challenging. Typical activation functions
include ReLU, logistic, tanh, exponential linear unit, linear
functions, for instance, satisfy the following monotonic as-
sumption.
Assumption 4.2 For any two scalars z1 ≤ z2, the activation
function satisfies φ(z1) ≤ φ(z2).
Assumption 4.2 is a common property that can be satisfied
by a variety of activation functions. For example, it is easy
to verify that the most commonly used such as logistic, tanh,
ReLU, all satisfy Assumption 4.2. Taking advantage of the
monotonic property of φ, the interval extension [φ]([z]) =
[φ(z), φ(z)]. Therefore, y
i
and yi in (12) and (13) can be
explicitly written out as
y
i
=
∑n
j=1
p
ij
+ θi (14)
yi =
∑n
j=1
pij + θi (15)
with p
ij
and pij defined by
p
ij
=
{
ωijxj , ωij ≥ 0
ωijxj , ωij < 0
(16)
pij =
{
ωijxj , ωij ≥ 0
ωijxj , ωij < 0
. (17)
From (14)–(17), the output interval of a single layer can be
efficiently computed with these explicit expressions. Then,
we consider the feedforward neural network y{L} = Φ(x{0})
with multiple layers, the interval extension [Φ]([x{0}]) can be
computed by the following layer-by-layer computation.
Theorem 4.2 Consider feedforward neural network (5) with
activation function satisfying Assumption 4.2 and an interval
input [x{0}], an interval extension can be determined by
[Φ]([x{0}]) = [φˆL] ◦ · · · ◦ [φˆ1] ◦ [φˆ0]([x{0}]) (18)
where [φˆ`]([x{`}]) = [φ`](W{`}[x{`}] + θ{`}) = [y{`}] in
which
y{`}
i
=
∑n{`}
j=1
p{`}
ij
+ θ
{`}
i (19)
y
{`}
i =
∑n{`}
j=1
p
{`}
ij + θ
{`}
i (20)
with p{`}
ij
and p{`}ij defined by
p{`}
ij
=
{
ω
{`}
ij x
{`}
j , ω
{`}
ij ≥ 0
ω
{`}
ij x
{`}
j , ω
{`}
ij < 0
(21)
p
{`}
ij =
{
ω
{`}
ij x
{`}
j , ω
{`}
ij ≥ 0
ω
{`}
ij x
{`}
j , ω
{`}
ij < 0
. (22)
Proof. We denote φˆ`(x{`}) = φ`(W{`}x{`} + θ{`}).
For a feedforward neural network, it essentially has x{`} =
φˆ`−1(x{`−1}), ` = 1, . . . , L which leads to (18). Then, for
each layer, the interval extension [y{`}] computed by (19)–
(22) can be obtained directly from (14)–(17). 
We denote the set image for neural network Φ as follows
Φ([x{0}]) = {Φ(x{0}) : x{0} ∈ [x{0}]}. (23)
Since [Φ] is inclusion monotonic according to Theorem 4.1,
one has Φ([x{0}]) ⊆ [Φ]([x{0}]). Thus, it is sufficient to
claim the neural network is safe if [Φ]([x{0}])∩¬S = ∅ holds
by Lemma 3.1.
According to the explicit expressions (18)–(22), the com-
putation on interval extension [Φ] is fast. In the next step,
we should discuss the conservativeness for the computation
outcome of (18). We have [Φ]([x{0}]) = Φ([x{0}]) +
E([x{0}]) for some interval-valued function E([x{0}]) with
w([Φ]([x{0}])) = w(Φ([x{0}])) + w(E([x{0}])).
Definition 4.3 We call w(E([x{0}])) = w([Φ]([x{0}])) −
w(Φ([x{0}])) the excess width of interval extension of neural
network Φ([x{0}]).
Explicitly, the excess width measures the conservativeness
of interval extension [Φ] regarding its corresponding function
Φ. The following theorem gives the upper bound of the excess
width w(E([x{0}])).
4
Theorem 4.3 Consider feedforward neural network (5) with
an interval input [x{0}], the excess width w(E([x{0}])) satis-
fies
w(E([x{0}])) ≤ γw([x{0}]) (24)
where γ = ξL
∏L
`=1
∥∥W{`}∥∥.
Proof. We have [Φ]([x{0}]) = Φ([x{0}]) + E([x{0}]) for
some E([x{0}]) and
w(E([x{0}])) = w([Φ]([x{0}]))− w(Φ([x{0}]))
≤ w([Φ]([x{0}]))
≤ ξL
∏L
`=1
∥∥∥W{`}∥∥∥w([x{0}])
which means (24) holds. 
Given a neural network Φ which means W{`} and ξ are
fixed, Theorem 4.3 implies that a less conservative result
can be only obtained by reducing the width of input interval
[x{0}]. On the other hand, a smaller w([x{0}]) means more
subdivisions of an input interval which will bring more com-
putational cost. Therefore, how to generate appropriate sub-
divisions of an input interval is the key for safety verification
of neural networks in the framework of interval analysis. In
the next section, an efficient specification-guided method is
proposed to address this problem.
4.3 Specification-Guided Safety Verification
Inspired by the Moore-Skelboe algorithm [6], we propose a
specification-guided algorithm, which generates fine subdivi-
sions particularly with respect to specification, and also avoid
unnecessary subdivisions on the input interval for safety veri-
fication, see Algorithm 1.
The implementation of the specification-guided algorithm
shown in Algorithm 1 checks that the intersection between
output set and unsafe region is empty, within a pre-defined tol-
erance ε. This is accomplished by dividing and checking the
initial input interval into increasingly smaller sub-intervals.
• Initialization. Set a tolerance ε > 0. Since our approach
is based on interval analysis, convert input setX to an in-
terval [x] such that X ⊆ [x]. Compute the initial output
interval [y] = [Φ]([x]). Initialize setM = {([x], [y])}.
• Specification-guided bisection. This is the key in the
algorithm. Select an element ([x], [y]) for specification-
guided bisection. If the output interval [y] of sub-interval
[x] has no intersection with the unsafe region, we can
discard this sub-interval for the subsequent dividing and
checking since it has been proven safe. Otherwise, the
bisection action will be activated to produce finer subdi-
visions to be added toM for subsequent checking. The
bisection process is guided by the given safety specifi-
cation, since the activations of bisection actions are to-
tally determined by the non-emptiness of the intersec-
tion between output interval sets and the given unsafe
Algorithm 1 Specification-Guided Safety Verification
Input: A feedforward neural network Φ : Rn{0} → Rn{L} ,
an input set X ⊆ Rn{0} , a safety specification S ⊆
Rn{L} , a tolerance ε > 0
Output: Safe or Uncertain
1: xi ← minx∈X (xi), xi ← maxx∈X (xi)
2: [x]← [x1, x1]× . . . ,×[xn{0} , xn{0} ]
3: [y]← [Φ]([x])
4: M← {([x], [y])}
5: whileM 6= ∅ do
6: Select and remove an element ([x], [y]) fromM
7: if [y] ∩ ¬S = ∅ then
8: Continue
9: else
10: if w([x]) > ε then
11: Bisect [x] to obtain [x1] and [x2]
12: for i = 1 : 1 : 2 do
13: if [xi] ∩ X 6= ∅ then
14: [yi]← [Φ]([xi])
15: M←M∪ {([xi], [yi])}
16: end if
17: end for
18: else
19: return Uncertain
20: end if
21: end if
22: end while
23: return Safe
region. This distinguishing feature leads to finer subdi-
visions when the output set is getting close to the unsafe
region, and on the other hand coarse subdivisions are suf-
ficient for safety verification when the output set is far
wary from the unsafe area. Therefore, unnecessary com-
putational cost can be avoided. In the experiments sec-
tion, it will be clearly observed how the bisection actions
are guided by safety specification in a numeral example.
• Termination. The specification-guided bisection pro-
cedure continues until M = ∅ which means all sub-
intervals have been proven safe, or the width of sub-
divisions becomes less than the pre-defined tolerance ε
which leads to an uncertain conclusion for the safety. Fi-
nally, when Algorithm 1 outputs an uncertain verification
result, we can select a smaller tolerance ε to perform the
safety verification.
5 Experiments
5.1 Random Neural Network
To demonstrate how the specification-guided idea works in
safety verification, a neural network with two inputs and two
outputs is proposed. The neural network has 5 hidden layers,
and each layer contains 10 neurons. The weight matrices and
5
Table 1: Comparison on number of intervals and computa-
tional time to existing approach
Intervals Computational Time
Algorithm 1 4095 21.45 s
Xiang et al. 2018 111556 294.37 s
bias vectors are randomly generated. The input set is assumed
to be [x{0}] = [−5, 5]×[−5, 5] and the unsafe region is ¬S =
[1,∞)× [1,∞).
We execute Algorithm 1 with termination parameter ε =
0.01, the safety can be guaranteed by partitioning [x{0}]
into 4095 interval sets. The specification-guided partition of
the input space is shown in Figure 1. A non-uniform in-
put space partition is generated based on the specification-
guided scheme. An obvious specification-guided effect can
be observed in Figure 1. The specification-guided method re-
quires much less computational complexity compared to the
approach in [3] which utilizes a uniform partition of input
space, and a comparison is listed in Table 1. The computa-
tion is carried out using Matlab 2017 on a personal computer
with Windows 7, Intel Core i5-4200U, 1.6GHz, 4 GB RAM.
It can be seen that the number of interval sets and compu-
tational time have been significantly reduced to 3.67% and
7.28%, respectively, compared to those needed in [3]. Figure
2 illustrates the union of 4095 output interval sets, which has
no intersection with the unsafe region, illustrating the safety
specification is verified. Figure 2 shows that the output in-
terval estimation is guided to be tight when it comes close to
unsafe region, and when it is far way from the unsafe area, a
coarse estimation is sufficient to verify safety.
Figure 1: Specification-guided bisections of input interval by
Algorithm 1. Guided by safety specification, finer partitions
are generated when the output intervals are close to the unsafe
region, and coarse partitions are generated when the output
intervals are far wary.
Figure 2: Output set estimation of neural networks. Blue
boxes are output intervals, red area is unsafe region, black
dots are 5000 random outputs.
5.2 Robotic Arm Model
θ
θ
 / =
 / =  [ \
Figure 3: Robotic arm with two joints. The normal working
zone of (θ1, θ2) is colored in green θ1, θ2 ∈ [ 5pi12 , 7pi12 ]. The
buffering zone is in yellow θ1, θ2 ∈ [pi3 , 5pi12 ] ∪ [ 7pi12 , 2pi3 ]. The
forbidden zone is θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, pi3 ] ∪ [ 2pi3 , 2pi].
In [3], a learning forward kinematics of a robotic arm
model with two joints is proposed, shown in Figure 3. The
learning task is using a feedforward neural network to predict
the position (x, y) of the end with knowing the joint angles
(θ1, θ2). The input space [0, 2pi]× [0, 2pi] for (θ1, θ2) is clas-
sified into three zones for its operations: normal working zone
θ1, θ2 ∈ [ 5pi12 , 7pi12 ], buffering zone θ1, θ2 ∈ [pi3 , 5pi12 ] ∪ [ 7pi12 , 2pi3 ]
and forbidden zone θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, pi3 ] ∪ [ 2pi3 , 2pi]. The detailed
formulation for this robotic arm model and neural network
training can be found in [3].
The safety specification for the position (x, y) is S =
{(x, y) | −14 ≤ x ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ y ≤ 17}. The input set
of the robotic arm is the union of normal working and buffer-
ing zones, that is (θ1, θ2) ∈ [pi3 , 2pi3 ] × [pi3 , 2pi3 ]. In the safety
point of view, the neural network needs to be verified that
all the outputs produced by the inputs in the normal working
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zone and buffering zone will satisfy safety specification S. In
[3], a uniform partition for input space is used, and thus 729
intervals are produced to verify the safety property. Using
our specification-guided approach, the safety can be guaran-
teed by partitioning the input space into only 15 intervals, see
Figure 4 and Figure 5. Due to the small number of intervals
involved in the verification process, the computational time is
only 0.27 seconds for specification-guided approach.
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
/3 < x1 < 2 /3
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
/3
 <
 x
2 
<
 2
/3
Partition of input space
Figure 4: 15 sub-intervals for robotic arm safety verification.
5.3 Handwriting Image Recognition
In this handwriting image recognition task, we use
5000 training examples of handwritten digits which
is a subset of the MNIST handwritten digit dataset
(http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/), examples from the
dataset are shown in Figure 6. Each training example is
a 20 pixel by 20 pixel grayscale image of the digit. Each
pixel is represented by a floating point number indicating the
grayscale intensity at that location. We first train a neural
network with 400 inputs, one hidden layer with 25 neurons
and 10 output units corresponding to the 10 digits. The
activation functions for both hidden and output layers are
sigmoid functions. A trained neural network with about
97.5% accuracy is obtained.
Under adversarial perturbations, the neural network may
produce a wrong prediction. For example in Figure 7(a)
which is an image of digit 2, the label predicted by the neu-
ral network will turn to 1 as a 4 × 4 perturbation belonging
to [−0.5, 0.5] attacks the left-top corner of the image. With
our developed verification method, we wish to prove that the
neural network is robust to certain classes of perturbations,
that is no perturbation belonging to those classes can alter the
prediction of the neural network for a perturbed image. Since
there exists one adversarial example for 4 perturbations at the
left-top corner, it implies this image is not robust to this class
of perturbation. We consider another class of perturbations,
3× 3 perturbations at the left-top corner, see Figure 7(b). Us-
Figure 5: Safety verification for neural network of robotic
arm. Blue boxes are output intervals, red box are boundary
for unsafe region, black dots are 5000 random outputs. 15
output intervals are sufficient to prove the safety.
Figure 6: Examples from the MNIST handwritten digit
dataset.
ing Algorithm 1, the neural network can be proved to be ro-
bust to all 3× 3 perturbations located at at the left-top corner
of the image, after 512 bisections.
Moreover, applying Algorithm 1 to all 5000 images with
3×3 perturbations belonging to [−0.5, 0.5] and located at the
left-top corner, it can be verified that the neural network is
robust to this class of perturbations for all images. This result
means this class of perturbations will not affect the prediction
accuracy of the neural network. The neural network is able to
maintain its 97.5% accuracy even subject to any perturbations
belonging to this class of 3× 3 perturbations.
7
Figure 7: Perturbed image of digit 2 with perturbation in
[−0.5.0.5]. (a) 4 × 4 perturbation at the left-top corner, the
neural network will wrongly label it as digit 1. (b) 3 × 3
perturbation at the left-top corner, the neural network can be
proved to be robust for this class of perturbations.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduce a specification-guided approach
for safety verification of feedforward neural networks with
general activation functions. By formulating the safety ver-
ification problem into the framework of interval analysis, a
fast computation formula for calculating output intervals of
feedforward neural networks is developed. Then, a safety
verification algorithm which is called specification-guided is
developed. The algorithm is specification-guided since the
activation of bisection actions are totally determined by the
existence of intersections between the computed output inter-
vals and unsafe sets. This distinguishing feature makes the
specification-guided approach be able to avoid unnecessary
computations and significantly reduce the computational cost.
Several experiments are proposed to show the advantages of
our approach.
Though our approach is general in the sense that it is not tai-
lored to specific activation functions, the specification-guided
idea has potential to be further applied to other methods deal-
ing with specific activation functions such as ReLU neural
networks to enhance their scalability. Moreover, since our
approach can compute the output intervals of a neural net-
work, it can be incorporated with other reachable set estima-
tion methods to compute the dynamical system models with
neural network components inside such as extension of [3] to
closed-loop systems [19] and neural network models of non-
linear dynamics [20].
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